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Abstract
Jaipur’s rapid development has resulted in its infrastructure lagging behind
population and industrial growth, which is especially evident in the unsightly and
unsanitary piles of solid waste (garbage) on the roads. This project took a broad system
approach to understand Jaipur’s solid waste management system. It investigated how the
system is carried out, some obstacles to its success, and the role of Public Private
Partnerships (PPPs). The findings indicate that there is a multiple-tiered hierarchical
system. The system involves a formal sector comprised of female and male sweepers,
permanent and impermanent workers, and an informal sector of ragpickers and door-todoor collectors, door-to-door recyclers, NGOs, and private companies. The main
problems to implementation of the system include lack of citizen awareness and
commitment, no segregation of waste, corruption, technology, and funding. PPPs can
help fund larger projects as well as offer expertise, but often the ventures are unprofitable, which discourages companies from undertaking them. Many new projects and
regulations such as a new scientific landfill, a composting service, and stricter penalties
for littering and dirtying the city are currently underway, which should greatly improve
Jaipur’s cleanliness.

Introduction

Like many cities in India, Jaipur is undergoing rapid development. The country’s
GDP has been increasing at 8% per year1. In Jaipur, the population was 2.34 million
according to the 2001 census, and is now estimated to be over 3.5 million2, 3. The process
of development involves effects of globalization such as a growing economy, imported
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resources, information and technology sharing, and more extensive infrastructure. As the
growth of various sectors has exploded, more inputs are required. This necessarily means
more output is also produced, manifesting itself in a large volume of waste. “Waste” is
simply something that is no longer deemed useful and is discarded. However, a shift in
attitude to view waste as a resource rather than as something useless is the first step
needed to reduce it.
Waste can be classified into four categories: Municipal solid waste, hazardous
waste, biomedical waste, and electronic waste (E-waste). Municipal solid waste (MSW)
includes what is thrown out by households and the commercial sector, such as food
scraps, yard clippings, and demolition debris. It is important to address because it is the
waste that the general public has the most contact with, and has a high political profile
because the public is made up of voters. Also, MSW is one of the harder types wastes to
manage since it has so many different components, so if it can be managed effectively,
then management of other types of solid waste that are more homogenous should be
easier to tackle (McDougall et al, 2008).
Jaipur’s daily production of solid waste is around 1100 MT/day. Of that amount,
200-250 MT remain on the streets, meaning lifting efficiency is around 80%.4 The per
capita solid waste production per day is 350 g, which with an average family size of five
results in 1.75 kg per day.5 There are no data published on the composition of waste in
Jaipur in particular, although the figures for India in general are a fairly accurate
representation for Jaipur as well. In India, the makeup of waste is roughly 50%
biodegradable, 25% inerts (construction and demolition waste), 9% plastic, 8% paper, 4%
rags, and 1% glass6. The composition of waste varies from season to season. In the
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summer there is more biodegradable waste because of more vegetation.7 The amount of
plastic in waste has supposedly been decreasing due to the recent ban on plastic carrying
bags in Rajasthan beginning August 2010.
Hazardous sanitary conditions from epidemics provided the impetus for taking
solid waste management seriously and establishing a proper management system. The
pneumonic plague of 1994, which started in the city of Surat, Gujarat, awakened the
government to the severity of the need for proper sanitation. In response, in1995, The
Bajaj Committee was formed to make recommendations on proper SWM8.
Another impetus towards current SWM reforms was the Public Interest Litigation
(PIL) filed by Mrs. Almitra H. Patel in 1996 against the Union of India and heard in
India’s Supreme Court.9,10 After many hearings, in 1998 the Supreme Court ordered the
formation of a committee under the direction of Mr. Asim Burman, commissioner of the
Kolkata Municipal Corporation to oversee SWM in Class-I cities. (Class-I cities are those
with a population of over one million, and Class-II cities are those with a population less
than one million.) One of the main recommendations of this committee was to include the
private sector in SWM in order to receive assistance with funding and specialized
expertise. Mrs. Patel was also instrumental in the drafting of the Municipal Solid Wastes
(Management and Handling) Rules 2000, which outline steps that municipal authorities
must take to regulate MSW.
Solid waste management was selected as the topic of this study because it is a
visible environmental sustainability issue that India is confronting. Jaipur in particular
was selected as the study site location because it is large enough to have a complex SWM
to examine, but is small enough to be manageable for a study of less than one-month
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duration. Also, since Jaipur is a rapidly developing city, effective waste management
practices are especially urgent. The objective of the study was to learn as much as
possible about Jaipur’s SWM through a broad-based approach. In particular, the
following questions were investigated: (1). Who are all the players in Jaipur’s solid waste
management system and how is it implemented? (2). What have been the successes and
the challenges in its implementation and how are the challenges being addressed? (3).
How do public-private partnerships in solid waste management work, what is their role,
and are they successful?
Field work methods involved meetings and interviews with Jaipur Municipal
Corporation officials who work at different levels of SWM, NGOs, the head of a waste
processing plant under PPP contract, many different types of waste workers, and Jaipur
residents. In addition, site visits to waste collection centers, observation of collection,
and shadowing of a recycler on his route were conducted.
The findings indicate that Jaipur, under the direction of the Jaipur Municipal
Corporation, is making many strides in the right direction for improving waste
management. Measures in progress include implementing of new surveillance measures
and fines for fouling public areas, establishing a scientific landfill site and composting
plant, drafting plans for a waste management program under contract with a private
company, and combating absenteeism with biometric machines. Nevertheless, much
room still remains for improvement, including reducing corruption, spreading more
awareness to citizens about proper disposal techniques, and better management of
financial resources to best cover the city’s needs.
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System Implementation

Solid waste is managed by the Jaipur Municipal Corporation (Jaipur Nagar
Nigam). At the political level, the mayor is at the top, accompanied by a health and
sanitation committee, made of up five elected and three nominated members. The
administrative hierarchy is headed by a CEO, under whom is a health commissioner,
garage commissioner, and a chief engineer (CE) (Appendix A). Jaipur is divided into 77
wards grouped into eight zones. Under the health commissioner, currently Mr. Shakti
Singh Sisodia, each zone has a commissioner, a health officer, and a chief sanitary
inspector. One sanitary inspector for each ward employs sweepers (safai karamchari)
who are monitored by a supervisor (jamadar).
The sweepers work in two shifts: a morning shift from 6-10 AM (or 7-11 AM in
the winter), and an afternoon shift from 2:30-5:30 PM. The sweepers are usually formal
workers paid either by the JMC or by a private contractor, if the ward where they work
has been contracted out. In total, 5,644 people are permanent workers for the JMC, while
1,060 are on contract11. Permanent workers earn approximately Rs 4,500-6,000 per
month. Temporary, impermanent sweepers are hired by the JMC as the need arises, and
earn approximately Rs 2,500 per month. All employees have the same working hours
(eight hours a day) regardless of salary or permanent/impermanent status.12 Work is
segregated by gender, so the female sweepers and the male sweepers do different tasks,
however their salaries are the same.
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The female sweepers’ tasks involve sweeping the streets with their brooms, and
aggregating the waste in piles on the sides of the roads. They are assigned beats
(designated area within a ward) to clean. The number of beats or the size of the
designated area to be cleaned during their shift is based on population, as regulated by the
MSW (Management and Handling) Rules 2000. In congested areas with high population,
sweepers clean 250-350 m, in less congested areas, 400 m, and in sparsely populated
areas, 500 m.13 All tools are provided for the sweepers, and are locked in the ward office
after every day. The one exception is brooms. Ladies are supposed to bring these on their
own, but they are still given Rs 75 every month to buy a new broom. Some use the same
broom for 2-3 months to save the extra Rs 75-150, but then their brooms become so short
that they have to bend over, straining their backs.
The male “sweepers” de-silt surface drains to ensure that water flow is not
blocked, as well as lift up the waste that the women sweepers collected on the street
corners and put it in their handcarts. They used to use a wheelbarrow which just had one
compartment, but now they are using a cart with six separate buckets—two
compartments for the material they cleaned from the surface drains, and four for the rest
of the garbage, which can include grass clippings and sticks that residents put out on the
street. Many of these workers work together in pairs, sometimes with a family member.
One male sweeper interviewed said he and his brother cover about two beats while doing
their work, for which they earn approximately Rs1700-1800 per month after deduction.14
This amount is significantly less than the Rs 4,500-6,000 permanent workers are
supposed to be earning. No reason is accounted for in this discrepancy.
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Every year the permanent sweepers who clean drains are given aprons, goggles,
gum boots, and masks. According to the JMC, many workers only wear them for a few
days and then leave them at home, or they will not wear this equipment in the summer
because it is too hot15. However, according to a permanent trash worker who works for
the JMC, they only got such shoes and gloves a long time ago. Now they do not receive
any facilities from the government. He said this is just how the government runs:
sometimes they start and sometimes they stop services without explanation.16 Apparently
the JMC used to provide their workers with protective wear but have stopped after they
thought the gear was not being utilized.
After their handcarts are full, these male “sweepers” bring the waste to a
municipal bin. Two to three sweepers come to one container. The JMC bought 800 waste
disposal bins to be dispersed throughout the city. In theory, one-cubic-meter waste
disposal bins with a storage capacity of ½ ton of waste are placed every 250 meters along
streets. Based on observation, there do not seem to be this many. Currently 55 of the 77
wards are “containerized” (have containers); the wards of the Old City are not
containerized due to past objections, likely regarding space concerns.17 Those containers
that are in usage are often in very poor condition, with holes so big that waste is spilling
out the sides. There are approximately 40 such bins in Civil Lines, according to a
permanent garbage worker who works there18. In Civil Lines at least, JMC lorries are
observed to arrive around 7:30 AM to remove the waste. Two large bins of 2.5 or 3.5
cubic meters can fit on each lorry.19 Each bin is mechanically hoisted up onto the back of
the lorry, and in its place an empty bin is left.
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The informal sector plays an equally important role in waste management. It is
made up of mainly ragpickers, who sift through garbage in dumping sites and remove
those salvageable materials, such as plastics, glass, and metal, which can be sold to scrap
dealers for recycling. Ragpickers are at the lowest strata of the social ladder, those who
used to be called “Untouchables” or harijans 20. They do their work out of necessity,
because they are illiterate and have no other alternative. Others included in the informal
sector are door-to-door waste collectors and kabaris who buy recyclable materials from
door-to-door and sell them at scrap dealer shops. The researcher got to meet on several
occasions with a kabari and observe his work (Appendix B).
The method for waste collection from houses depends on the community.
Currently door-to-door collection is not undertaken by the formal sector, but is being
done by the informal sector in some colonies such as in Nemi Sagar Colony of Vaishali
Nagar, Sarti Nagar, and Mahaveernagar. Families pay about Rs 40 per month to the waste
collectors for their services21. The collectors usually come to a house every day, but at
times they can be unreliable—there are some days when they do not come at all.22 The
number of houses they service can range from 60-80 in some neighborhoods, to 150-200
in other neighborhoods23, 24. Collectors often work together in pairs, sometimes with a
brother or family member, and each earns about Rs 1500 per month.
In other areas such as along JLN Marg, residents dispose of their own waste in
community bins which are shared by about 20-25 homes. A municipal van comes daily to
pick it up. This service started about two or three years ago25.
Unfortunately, many of Jaipur’s residents neither get their waste collected from
their home nor dispose of it in bins. Instead, they just dump it wherever is convenient and
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out of sight. Garbage abounds in empty lots next to people’s houses all over the city.
Even in wealthier neighborhoods like Shree Rampura Colony, empty lots are taken
advantage of as small dumping grounds. It is to empty lots like these, as well as bigger
dumpyards and dump sites under or near bridges, that ragpickers come to do their
business.
Ragpickers can be male or female, and any age. Usually adult men and women do
not work together, but rather a group of men and boys, a woman and her mother, or a
woman and a group of children. It is common for working companions to be related.
Ragpickers’ earnings can vary from Rs 50-100 per day or Rs 100-150 per day for others
from four to five hours of work26, 27. They usually come to the same place every day to do
their work, rather than wander around, likely in order to stay near where they live. After
sorting out the recyclable goods and putting them in bags or in a metal container on a
cart, the ragpickers take and sell them to a kabari shop, which re-sells them to companies.
Ragpickers working near Gopalpuria Puliya sell their collected materials near a
graveyard in Mahesh Nagar, and those working near the bridge by Central Hospital sell at
Pata near Sindhi Camp. Some ragpickers are very aware about health concerns such as
inhaling toxic fumes from arising from their job, while others are not. When asked if this
work is hard, ragpicker Mahaveer says “It’s hard—you can get sick from it. You can get
cut from glass.” But when another ragpicker was asked if there were any health concerns
from this work, she said no. Perhaps she gave this answer because she truly was unaware
of the health concerns associated with waste. Or perhaps she interpreted the question as
an insinuation that her work was unclean and degrading, so she was embarrassed and was
defending herself.
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After the collection stage, waste is transported and then taken for storage. Upon
collecting waste from the municipal containers, JMC trucks take it to one of Jaipur’s five
or six transfer stations. From there it is brought to a dumpyard or landfill. Jaipur has three
such locations where solid waste ultimately ends up. One is at Matheradaspura, which is
a 46-hectare dumpyard about 17 km from Jaipur by the Delhi Bypass. Four hundred
metric tonnes (MT) of waste per day are dumped there28. The second is at Sewapura, a
44-hectare dumpyard about 20 km away on Siker Road. Here 250 MT of waste are taken
every day. A company called Infrastructure Leasing Financial Services (ILFS), Ecosmart,
will start producing compost at the site under Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in about
18 months. The third is a 121-hectare scientific landfill site at Langariyawas Village,
about 25 km outside of Jaipur. Its capacity is 300 MT. Scientific landfills differ from
regular landfills in a few ways. The most important distinguishing factor of a scientific
landfill is the geomembrane liner. This is fitted along the sides and bottom of the pit so
that leachate, or liquid from waste that can contain hazardous material, is prevented from
seeping into the ground. The scientific landfill project at Langariyawas, costing 20 crore,
was undertaken due to the stipulation of the federal MSW 2000 Rules. It has been under
construction for about the last year and a half, and is scheduled for completion in about
six months.29

Problems in Management

One problem that all of India’s work force faces is absenteeism, and solid waste
management is no exception. In general, there is a rate of 10-20% absenteeism at the
work place.30 At times, rather than coming to work, workers will just send someone else
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in their place. When confronted about their absence, they will simply offer a bribe to their
superior in order to be marked as present. The effect of absenteeism is, of course, a
shortage of manpower, which, when coupled with the shortage of machinery and
equipment, yields few results. As if absenteeism alone was not bad enough, there are
about 100 days off a year (including Sundays) when the formal sector workers do not
collect garbage and it just sits on the streets31.
To amend the absenteeism problem, the Jaipur Municipal Corporation has
installed two biometric machines in their main office, which scan workers’ fingerprints as
they come into work to ensure attendance as well as stamp a daily card. Soon biometric
machines will also be installed in each of Jaipur’s eight zone offices. However this effort
has been met with resistance by labor unions. In early May 2011 the JMC is expecting a
strike by workers in opposition to the installation of the machines. In the event of a strike
the JMC usually responds by withholding salaries, taking other factions of the union into
confidence (supposedly to have insiders quell the uprising), and employing a temporary
workforce.32
Another obstacle to thorough waste collection is physical accessibility. Jaipur’s
widespread area and the constant growth of the city make it hard to monitor all areas.
Although the city is systematically divided into eight zones, not all streets of all zones are
cleaned by JMC workers. Those streets that are not covered by the JMC are serviced by
the informal sector. But even then there are certain areas like slums which are harder to
reach and are not as well maintained. Certain areas are given higher priority for cleaning.
The old walled city area, areas of historic importance, as well as VIP areas all have top
priority, while the outskirts of the city are given less attention.33
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There are also temporary encroachments in the street such as animals, people,
chairs and tables outside shops, and vehicles which sometimes prevent the sweepers from
doing their jobs properly. Animals used to be kept on the street more, and would
sometimes get in the way, but now there have been efforts to keep them in pens,
especially buffalo and camels. Even the people who sleep on the foot paths, as well as
vehicles kept on the roadsides prevent all areas from being accessible to cleaning. When
people leave for work after 9 AM they take their vehicles with them, but some sweepers
have already started working by then. To amend this problem, the number of cars on the
road in general should be reduced using a technique such as has been done in Beijing,
where no new licenses are issued out to cars.34 Similarly, when shops open at around 10
AM, sweepers may have already serviced the area in front of the shop. Then the shop
keepers sweep their shops before the day’s work begins, and dump the waste right onto
the streets, rather than taking it to the proper disposal bins or waiting until the evening
sweeper shift comes.
Although penalties are in place for improper dumping, the fines do not deter
many. Fines of up to Rs 20,000 have been collected at one time for vehicles dumping
large amounts of garbage. Apparently violators would rather pay the fine than have their
vehicles seized.35 Currently new surveillance programs are being initiated to deter
residents from soiling public areas. Sanitary inspectors armed with digital cameras to
record evidence stand duty on the streets on the look-out for people who dirty their
surroundings. As recently as May 2nd, 2011, the Watch Riders Scheme was launched.
“Watch Riders” are patrolling police (one per ward) who also have digital cameras and
are authorized to fine offenders on the spot. Violations include spitting, urinating,
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defecating, washing clothes or utensils on the street, allowing pets or kept animals to
defecate on streets, and of course, dumping garbage. This new scheme was promulgated
for a week to educate people about the new laws, culminating in a rally on May 1st, 2011.
Pamphlets were distributed, announcements were made over loudspeaker, and electronic
media promotions were dispensed in its promotion.36 Many of those who are responsible
for spoiling the city are uneducated and cannot read and write, so in order to target this
group, loudspeaker announcements should be emphasized. This suggestion is in response
to the notion held by many SWM workers that Jaipur’s laws regarding SWM are good,
but the implementation is poor in part due to ignorance by the poor and illiterate.
In addition to the aforementioned areas of improvement, which were proposed by
respondents who work in the system, the researcher has another reform suggestion with
regards to the JMC’s budget. The Jaipur Municipal Corporation’s budget is broken down
as follows (figures have been rounded to exclude decimals). In total 16, 344 lakhs per
year are spent on Solid Waste Management. Of this, 12, 821 lakhs are spent on staff
salary, 1,032 on contractor workers’ salaries, 492 on electricity and fuel costs, 36 on
chemical costs, 251 on repair and maintenance, and 1710 on contractor services.37 It is
interesting to compare the JMC’s SWM budget with that of another municipality like
Mumbai (although the data acquired for Mumbai are not as detailed). In Mumbai, the
total spent on SWM is 1,000 crores per year. Of that amount, 60% goes for
transportation, 20% goes towards employee salaries, and 20% is allocated towards
operation maintenance.38
The numbers cannot be compared completely objectively because the categories
are not broken down the same way. However, if one examines Jaipur’s budget,
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combining both the permanent workers and contract workers, a full 85% is spent on staff
salaries, compared to a mere 20% in Mumbai (though it is unknown if the actual salary
amounts are higher). In general this trend can be explained by the sheer size difference of
the cities. Mumbai requires much more equipment and transportation to service its large
area and populace, so it makes sense that more funds are allocated towards those efforts.
However even the percentage Jaipur spends on staff salaries seems disproportionately
high. This is likely a result of hiring more employees every year without increasing each
of their duties accordingly, so more people are covering the same work. The JMC should
either increase the duties of each employee, or should instigate hiring freezes and instead
spend more money on staff training or buying new equipment.

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)
Jaipur has been engaged in public-private partnerships for the last ten years. It has
become necessary for the municipality to contract out some of its waste management
work because it cannot recruit enough staff to cover SWM in all wards. In those cases
private companies are hired.39 The PPP model is ideal because often waste disposal,
treatment, and operation necessitate exorbitant start-up costs, which the municipality
either cannot afford, or chooses not to spend. The JMC used to levy octroi (a customs
duty) as a source of revenue, but no longer do so due to resistance by various leaders. As
a result, The JMC does not have much at their disposal to invest in waste management
projects. Private parties, either NGOs or corporations, who are experts in a certain area
such as waste management, can thus offer shared cost and responsibility as well as their
specific knowledge about the project. The municipality is the owner and oversees the
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project, providing some resources, while the private company carries out the work. The
central government provides the rules for the partnership, the state or municipality
oversees the policy, and the State Regulatory Board oversees implementation.
There are various combinations of public and private participation in partnerships.
In a turn-key project, the design and construction of a waste facility is led by the
municipality and then turned over to a buyer to run. The responsibilities of collection,
transportation, and disposal can be given to a private company for a particular period
specified (minimum three years), while land is provided by the municipality (according
to MSW 2000 Rules). Alternatively, collection and transportation may be handled by a
private company, while processing and disposal are overseen by the municipality. Yet
another possibility is that collection is done by an NGO, transportation by the
municipality, and process, disposal, design, and construction by a private company. The
final option is that the municipality is not involved at all. Land ownership, collection,
process and disposal are all under the control of a private owner.40

Grasim Industries MSW Processing Plant
Grasim Industries, a cement producer and flagship company of Aditya Birla
Group, has a contract with the Jaipur Municipal Corportation on BOOT (Build, Operate,
Own, and Transfer) basis to operate an MSW plant. The plant, which is established right
next to the Langariyawas landfill, outputs Refuse-Derived Fuel (RDF). The RDF is then
used to power a cement plant, Grasim’s subsidiary Ultratech Cement Limited, in
Neemuch, Madhya Pradesh. Contracted under a 30-year contract in 2005 and
commissioned in 2007, the facility is India’s first fully-automated MSW processing plant.
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JMC initially provided 25 acres of land. They also deliver 500 MT of solid waste every
day. After giving 20 lakh as a security deposit to prove their earnestness in undertaking
the project, the rest of the management is left up to Aditya Birla Group. Aditya Birla
hired a German company called Doppstadt to build the whole plant facility and outfit it
with their state-of-the-art technology. They have also sublet their labor contract to
Pratham Envirotech Pvt. Ltd. at Hyderabad. Fifty workers are employed at the plant.41
The garbage has to undergo many transformations before it reaches its final
product of RDF. The five general steps in the process are size reduction, homogenization,
metal separation, segregation, and further size reduction. As JMC lorries carrying
garbage lifted from the city enter the plant, the garbage is weighed at the weigh station
before being dumped. Next, workers manually remove large and dangerous items such as
batteries, big stones, tires, dead animals, and heavy machinery. What remains is loaded
with a payloader into the pre-shredder, which reduces the grain size from 0-1000 mm to
0-200 mm. Subsequently it is sent into an integrated conveyor, over which a magnetic
separating machine is installed. The magnetic separator removes all the metal to be
recycled for the metal industry. After that is separation of biodegradable organic material
from sand and grit by way of a trommel screen (separation by size). The sand and grit is
to be taken away by farmers to be mixed with manure and used as fertilizer. The heavier
pieces that come from the trommel screen, such as glass and ceramics, go to the ballistic
separator (separation by density). The heavy, inorganic fraction gets dumped in the
landfill, whereas the light, organic fraction is sent for further homogenization and fine
shredding. This further size reduction results in a final grain size of 0-50 mm. What
results is garbage fluff, which is sent 400 km away to Grasim’s UltraTech cement plant.42
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However, this garbage fluff is still fairly low in calorific value. Therefore, in the
last cycle of homogenization and shredding, plastic is added to increase the calorific
value (recall that there is not much plastic in the waste because it has already been
removed by ragpickers.) This plastic is purchased from Sainath Enterprises at Rs 3/kg, or
Rs 3000/MT. Sainath Enterprises employs ragpickers to pick non-recyclable plastic (like
cracker and cookie wrappers as opposed to plastic bottles).
Although the plant is doing a good service for waste management, Grasim has
been suffering financially, and has lost about 20 crore just funding operational costs.
About 12-15 lakh per month of the operational costs are fixed. Because there are no
variable costs, Grasim has to pay whether or not they are producing RDF fuel. Since the
waste initially has a high rubble and low plastic content, there is low heat value, which
makes the production of enough RDF fuel to cover costs near-impossible. Of the 500 MT
of waste per day that JMC provides, the RDF plant is supposedly capable of producing
150 tons of RDF per day, (roughly a 30% recovery of useable refuse), but in reality it is
more like a 5-6% recovery rate.43
One reason the waste has such a high composition of rubble is because the
garbage truck drivers’ pay is based on the weight of the waste. Since a worker will earn
about Rs 400 per truckload, or 4 MT of waste, he will add “useless waste” like
construction debris to the garbage to make it heavier.44 Unfortunately, the construction
debris cannot even be bought by cement companies to be re-ground into cement because
it is mixed up with all the other garbage so it smells too bad. Furthermore, cement
companies are already established near their source of material at a limestone quarry, so
they have no motivation to spend money on extra transportation cost to go all the way to
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the plant to buy the smelly construction debris. It is due to reasons like this that it is
difficult to re-sell any of the waste for profit.
Grasim Industries is practically running this RDF plant as charity. But there is a
catch—because they are providing this waste management service they are more likely to
get favors later from the government in other work they do. That is, the government will
make things easier for them and will not get in their way. One other benefit of doing this
service is that they are awarded carbon credits for using RDF fuel and thereby save 9% of
the coal that would otherwise be burned to run the cement plant.45
According to a JMC health officer who prefers to remain anonymous, the above
information regarding low garbage value is not portrayed entirely accurately. The JMC
only recently became responsible for the transport of garbage to the Grasim plant. On
June 10, 2010, the transportation contract between Grasim and the other companies who
were responsible for bringing the waste to the plant was nullified. It was those other
companies’ workers who were paid based on weight and who added construction material
to the waste. The JMC workers who transport the waste now are not paid by weight and
have no such incentive. Grasim blames the JMC for not sending them high quality
garbage, but for the past year at least, the amount of construction material sent to the
plant ought to have been reduced.46
Mr. Gupta, the project manager of Grasim Industries, says that the main reason
they are only able to produce 5-6% instead 30% RDF from the received waste is due to
its poor caloric content. But according to the aforementioned anonymous health officer,
inadequate technology is also a culprit. The plant was commissioned as recently as four
years ago, yet even since then new companies have come out with superior RDF-
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processing technology. Although Grasim’s contract is supposed to last until 2035, it is
possible that it may be nullified in favor of a more efficient company taking up the job.
(This nullification would be justified on the grounds that Grasim sometimes refuses to
take all the garbage that is offered to them by the JMC, which is a clause provisioned in
the contract.) At an RDF plant in Mumbai, for example, 80% of the waste received is
converted to RDF, leaving only 20% to be dumped in the landfill. The owner of that plant
in Mumbai has had such success in fact, and made sufficient profit as to establish 20
other such plants nearby.47
In addition to PPPs taking the form of a partnership with the government, it can
also take the form of a partnership with an NGO. There are two NGOs in Jaipur working
on SWM: Satya an NGO (referred to hereafter as Satya), and the Centre for
Communication Development (CDC).

NGO #1, Satya
Under the SWM Rules 2000 there were no provisions for SWM in military
camps. To address this issue, five years ago a tri-party agreement was formed between
Satya, JMC, and Jaipur’s Military Station. Satya provides the labor, JMC oversees the
project, and the Jaipur Military provides the equipment. The Health and Hygiene program
initiatives include door-to-door waste collection within the military compound, which
cost 3.28 lakh in 2007 alone (last year for which there is data).48 Luckily, unlike some of
the other SWM projects contracted under PPP, Satya has not lost any money. The
compound is divided into three areas—the official’s area, the officer area, and the
regency area. Dustbins are stationed throughout the campus, and afterwards waste is
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transported to the dumpyard at Matheradaspura. Through regular training of the 137
workers with regards to garbage handling protocol, including the necessity of wearing
gloves and which types of garbage produce which kinds of hazardous gases, the program
has been met with success.
Although this PPP is a success story, Satya has not always had such luck in
partnerships with the JMC. From 2005-2007 Satya experimented with door-to-door
collection in ward 20 as well as in Chitrakoot, Vaishali Nagar. One thousand households
were involved from ward 20. Those who could afford to pay would give Rs 30 per month
per household for the service of waste pick-up, and those who were poorer were to pay
Rs 20 a month.49 However, only 100-200 of the 1000 households actually paid their dues.
Because of this, Satya was operating the project at a huge loss. Moreover, 3.5 lakhs have
yet to be settled between the JMC and Satya—that is, JMC owes Satya this amount of
money and still has not paid.50 According to Satya, the JMC was a poor facilitator
throughout the whole project and did not provide much support. Due to inadequacies in
the government, difficulties in managing payments, and corruption, the partnership was
not a smooth one. Ward 20 was taken up as a challenge because the inhabitants of that
area were unaware and unmotivated about proper waste disposal techniques. Satya
completed the two-year contract, but the project was discontinued afterwards.

NGO #2, Centre for Development Communication
The Centre for Development Communication (CDC) is another NGO which has
launched some efforts towards better urban solid waste management. CDC is a marketbased, rather than a charity-based NGO which maintains a close partnership with the
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JMC but does not receive financial support for its projects. They operate on the
withdrawal model, which means that they work with a city for about five years and then
plan to leave so as to encourage self-sufficiency. CDC has established itself in many
cities. They have an office in Jaipur and used to work on SWM there in 1995, specifically
in door-to-door collection and transportation. Now they have ceased work on these
initiatives and instead focus on other social service projects in Jaipur.51 These social
service projects include a Right to Information Campaign, Self-Help Groups and microenterprises, providing social security for the unorganized sector, urban health (e.g.
routine check-ups), and institutional development (e.g. economic empowerment and
combating forced evictions). A specific current project which indirectly relates to SWM
is their food wastage program. This service picks up left-over food from large functions
like weddings and distributes it to places like soup kitchens, thus reducing food waste.

Evaluation of PPP success
A prevalent opinion is that public-private partnerships in solid waste management
are mostly unsuccessful because they are unprofitable. When private companies who
work with SWM receive their funding from the JMC, they run into financial trouble due
to JMC’s lack of monetary resources. The only PPP that has been successful in Jaipur is
the partnership with National Highways. Otherwise, the profit margin is only about 4-5%,
which does not make the partnership viable for most companies.52
Examples like the RDF plant in Mumbai show that businesses involved with the
transformation of waste into other uses can, in fact, be profitable. When private
corporations enter the business, they do it for profit. On the bright side, currently about
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ten companies are showing interest for signing a contract for a “Comprehensive Sanitary
Program”. This program would handle all aspects of SWM from sweeping, to secondary
storage, to conversion under the BOOT (Build, Operate, Own, and Transfer) or DBOOT
(Design, Build, Operate, Own, and Transfer) design. One company that has expressed
interest is a German company called Hanjer Biotech Energies Pvt. Ltd, and their proposal
is currently under consideration.53
According to Mr. Anil Singhal, former executive engineer with the JMC, a step
that could be taken to improve the PPP model is to relax and simplify regulations
imposed on private corporations. For example, financial flexibility is very limited. A 10%
security deposit in cash is required before the initiation of any contracted project, which
deters many companies. To attract more companies, Mr. Singhal proposes that a bank
guarantee would work better.54 A bank guarantee allows a company who is entering
business with a much bigger entity, like a government, to have a third party (the bank)
give their support on the company’s behalf. The support takes the form of the guarantee,
which is a percentage of the contract. The government requires this guarantee because it
often has a hard time analyzing the financial track record and dependability of all the
tenders submitting proposals for the contract. So the third party evaluates the company’s
moveable and immoveable assets, as well as its financial reliability and vouches for the
company. If the company does not carry out the contract to the government’s satisfaction,
the guarantee is invoked and the bank has to pay that amount to the government. This
system benefits both the government and the company. It benefits the government
because the bank helps assess a company’s financial fitness. The bank guarantee also
benefits the company because it does not have to pay up-front in cash.
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Grasim Industries’ contract document indicates that they have an unconditional
Performance Bank Guarantee (if they fail to complete the project as laid out in the
contract, then the JMC can claim the guarantee).55 So it seems as though the bank
guarantee method is already being implemented with at least one PPP. Grasim also paid a
security deposit (but it was only 1%, not 10% of the total cost). Perhaps, then, both the
deposit and the guarantee systems can be used, though that option would not necessarily
be the best to attract the most tenders.
Another obstacle to the PPP mode’s success is corruption. Workers under
contracted labor are the most exploited, and sometimes do not even receive minimum
wage. Contractors will pay a bribe to JMC to ignore the fact that they are not following
wage standards.56 According to Mr. Sanjay Agarwal, CEO of Satya, “A PPP can only be
successful if there is no corruption. Smooth operation of the partnership requires
reciprocal efforts from both parties, so unless both are committed, it is not possible.”57
Thus it seems that one of the main ways to improve the solid waste management is to
reduce corruption. This, of course, is a huge task that will require long-sustained effort.
But starting with such legislation as the Right to Information Act and the recent anticorruption Lokpal Bill, progress can slowly be made towards this goal and necessity.

Integration of the Informal Sector
In all the discussion for waste management reforms, one group that is often
neglected is the informal sector workers, especially the ragpickers. Often times they are
harassed by police or people with a higher social standing, and are forcefully kept far
away from dumpyards landfills. Because they are not hired by the municipality or any
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company, they are also not given formal rights. Recently, for the first time however,
ragpickers have been recognized in national legislation.
The Plastic Waste (Management and Handling) Rules 2011 was drafted by the
Indian Government’s Ministry of Environment and Forests. Some of these new rules
include a ban on plastic sachets for packing or selling tobacco or pan, a ban on recycled
and compostable plastics for packaging food products, and the implementation of Bureau
of Indian Standards (BIS) regulations on carrying bags. The most radical part about the
rules, however, is their inclusion of waste pickers, which is the first time such a special
consideration has been made. The rules “require the municipal authority to constructively
engage agencies or groups working in waste management including these waste
pickers”.58 Though the rules oblige municipalities to engage the waste pickers, no
specific stipulations as to how the municipalities should go about this have been made. It
remains to be seen whether or not they will actually follow through, just as many
municipal authorities did not meet all requirements of the Municipal Solid Waste
(Management and Handling) Rules 2000.
In Jaipur, efforts to integrate the informal sector into the private sector in SWM
are not well established. This is likely because most existent PPPs do not deal with
collection of garbage—the stage in which the informal sector is most involved—but
rather its disposal. Also, training of the informal sector would be too costly, and private
companies are mainly concerned with profit. However there is a new integrated SWM
plan in the works, in which door-to-door trash collection, including segregation of waste,
would be implemented. This plan will go into effect June or July 2011 as soon as the
proposal letter receives clearance. Earlier the JMC experimented with door-to-door
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collection in a few wards under PPP (as previously discussed with CDC), but it failed.
Currently bidding is underway for tenders (private companies) to undertake the integrated
SWM project. Door-to-door collection is currently performed in some wards by the
informal sector. Privatization of this service would displace some of those workers. The
JMC might try to incorporate some of them into the system, but they are not sure yet.59
Although efforts to integrate the informal sector are only on the horizon in Jaipur,
such efforts have already begun to be implemented in other cities, such as Delhi. As of
June 2005, Delhi contracted out collection, segregation, transportation, and disposal of
solid waste in six zones to three different private companies. Segregation of waste is
carried through by workers at the dhalao (either a waste bin, or a small building structure
that houses a waste bin). It is further segregated at a central workshop, and those
materials that can be recycled are sent for recycling. Before privatization, segregation of
waste was only done by ragpickers. Although now the private sector is taking up some of
these duties, the informal sector is still very much present. Currently, roughly 300 out of
the 500 of the dhalao workers had previously been ragpickers. For these select few,
working conditions, sanitation, and salaries have been greatly improved. The workers’
jobs are made easier by the provision of separate bins for biodegradable and nonbiodegradable waste, regular disinfection of the dhalaos, safety equipment and uniforms,
sanitation trainings, and steady monthly wages. Only 300 ragpickers have benefited from
formal employment, while many more ragpickers continue to work in the same
conditions as before. However it is still a sign of progress that private companies are
beginning to turn to the informal sector to supply some of their labor.60
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Community Awareness, Involvement, and Education
Ignorance about good SWM practices and civilian apathy have been mentioned
by many as major impediments to better implementation of SWM laws. Awareness about
the dire need for waste management reform certainly seems to exist at the governmental
level, but is lacking at the citizen level. This is due largely to poverty and illiteracy.
At the governmental level, legislation is being developed that is geared towards
putting management on the right track. Expectations, goals, and timelines are presented,
holding different parties accountable for different aspects of waste management. For
example, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission is a seven year program
part of which focuses on responsible urban development and governance, including
SWM. It outlines goals for municipal reforms, which sectors are eligible for these
reforms, and how funding is to be allocated. Every city that participates is expected to
draft City Development Plans (CDPs) describing their policies and agenda for
development, as well as Detailed Project Reports (DPRs) identifying areas that require
attention and merit the undertaking of specific projects.61 For example the mission
allocates funds to Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) (in Jaipur, the municipal corporation) for
building up and attracting PPPs. Two thousand five hundred crore is to be given to the
state government as aid specifically towards developing PPPs in SWM.62
Similarly, the Municipal Solid Wastes (Management and Handling) Rules 2000
stipulates that it is the responsibility of the municipal authority to implement rules and
develop infrastructure as well as file annual reports on the status of its progress. The
ULBs were to have made the specified improvements to their SWM system by December
31st, 2003 at the latest. However, they were unable to meet the guidelines due to lack of
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resources and mismanagement. Therefore in a Supreme Court hearing on February 3,
2004 it was announced that ULBs must submit an annual progress report to the State
Pollution Control Board, which is then passed to the Central Pollution Control Board
(CPCB) and the Ministry of Environment and Forests. The CPCB is now coming up with
a new timeline for meeting the MSW 2000 guidelines, based on the progress reports of
the 59 cities involved.63
One of the requirements of the MSW (Management and Handling) Rules 2000 is
that municipalities “organize awareness programs for segregation of wastes and shall
promote recycling or reuse of segregated materials”.64 Segregation of waste at the source
is an essential and needed development since when all waste is mixed up, it is harder to
reconstitute any of the components for reuse, such as construction debris for cement or
organic material for fertilizer. The infrastructure to support segregation at the source must
needs come hand in hand with civilian responsibility and participation. In addition to
segregation at the source, civilian responsibility has to be developed in other aspects of
waste management as well.
At the citizen level, NGOs are taking the lead in the area of SWM education.
Previously the Centre for Development Communication was introduced as an NGO that
has done work in SWM. The effort for which CDC has garnered the most acclaim is the
“Swachta Doot-Aple Dari” Project, which won the UN Habitat Scroll of Honour Award
in 2004. This project, based in Nagpur, Maharashtra, features door-to-door collection and
segregation of waste at the source. Its creation was a response to the problems of
dependence on the municipality for waste management, the “not in my backyard”
attitude, non-segregation, and stigmatization of waste work. To address these issues, the
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project provides employment to the socially disadvantaged and creates a sustainable
community model for waste management.65
A unique feature of the program is its emphasis on education of the public.
Employees spend one out of four hours of work on education for proper waste disposal
practices. These efforts have helped build community support for the program.
Community members show support by using swatchta doot waste services exclusively
and giving voluntary tips to waste collectors. One shortcoming of this program is that the
education portion of it targets only a certain economic class of people—those who can
pay for door-to-door trash pick-up services. Those who need education about waste
management the most are those who are uneducated, poor, and illiterate, and do not have
access to other ways of learning about good SWM practices through other avenues such
as government-posted signs.
With an area of 218 km2 and a population of around 2.39 million, Nagpur is a
smaller city than Jaipur.66 However, it generates 1000 MT of waste per day, a level very
comparable to that of Jaipur.67 This similarity alone is not enough to suggest that the
Swachta Doot-Aple Dari model would necessarily be met with the same success in
Jaipur. Because the model relies in part on citizens’ support, if Jaipur’s residents are not
invested in doing their part to contribute to a cleaner city, as was true in the experimental
door-to-door collection in Ward 20, then even well-designed SWM may be ineffective.

Findings and Discussion

Thus far, various waste workers’ roles in the waste management system have
been laid out, as well as problems and how they are being addressed, and an evaluation of

28

PPPs. Because the first question of investigation is more factual, the second two will be
focused on here for analysis.
The main difficulties in solid waste management seem to stem from lack of
funding, poor law enforcement, and civilian unawareness and apathy. Further problems
related to funding include out-of-date technology and lack of trained workers. Within the
problem of poor law enforcement is also corruption, as officials take bribes to ignore
violations (both by other workers and by civilians).
Establishing more PPPs can actually help take care of some of the funding
problems. For example, in the agreement between JMC and Grasim Industries, JMC
provides the land and the garbage, and Grasim takes care of the funding for all the
machinery, workers, and maintenance. The JMC is not forfeiting anything that is valuable
to them; in fact, they are getting the garbage disposal problem off their shoulders. If more
PPPs can be established, especially ones that include some of the responsibilities like
sweeping that had formerly been under the jurisdiction of the JMC, then the JMC can
redirect those funds spent employing the sweepers, and use them instead on other
resources like better technology or staff training. The Comprehensive Sanitary Program,
in which a private company will oversee all aspects of waste lifecycle (from generation to
ultimate storage), is currently in the works. But in general, more attractive payment
options and reduced corruption are necessary both to attract more companies and to make
the partnerships run more smoothly.
Although accessibility of garbage bins has not been cited by any respondents as a
problem needing attention, personal observation suggests otherwise. In mid-March, the
JMC introduced some public waste bins to the little park in Nemi Sagar colony of
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Vaishali Nagar. They say “USE ME, JMC” on them. They are even shaped like fun
cartoon animals to make them more user-friendly. It is encouraging to see that the JMC is
providing such services. However public waste bins should not only be limited to parks—
they need to be placed throughout the whole city. There are large municipal collection
bins in the streets in most areas of the city, but are not actually every 250 meters as they
are supposed to be. Most Jaipurites do not want to have to wander in search of one to
throw out their paan wrapper. Also, these large bins take up a lot of space, so the areas in
which they can be placed are limited. In crowded downtown areas of the Old City, or in
commercial districts, smaller bins ought to be placed as well. If people were made aware
of them and if they were convenient to use, this would significantly reduce the amount of
waste tossed on the streets. The workload would then be lightened for the sweepers, but a
new job would also be created as these small bins would need to be emptied into the large
bins or collected directly by the lorries.
The study provided many opportunities for learning about the logistics of field
research. One challenge that repeatedly occurred while conducting research was
unforeseen holidays which rendered impromptu visits to offices difficult as they were
closed. On a positive note, many people were more than willing to meet and share their
knowledge. Sometimes those willing to help were not actually qualified on the topic of
SWM. On one occasion a meeting was arranged with a faculty member of Rajasthan
University who offered to meet and discuss Jaipur’s SWM. Upon meeting him, it soon
became evident that although he was well-versed in public policy, he did not have much
input to give on public policy of SWM. In addition, on two different occasions attempts
to visit recyclable collection and sale centers near Sindhi Camp bus station in Jaipur and
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in Sanganer were unsuccessful because the general location had been garnered by
ragpickers but the exact location was not known. When these locations were reached, no
one knew of the exact spot in question and no ragpickers could be found to show the way.
From all of these experiences a few lessons emerge. Contacts suggested by others are
preferable to those who are simply assumed might helpful. Also, it is best to have
someone who works in the industry and knows exactly where to go accompany the
researcher rather than trying to locate a spot from hearsay only.

Conclusions and Way Forward

The overall objective of the study was to investigate Jaipur’s solid waste
management system by examining: the major players involved and how the system is
implemented, the successes and challenges and how those challenges are being
addressed, and the nature of public-private partnerships and how they can be improved.
At the conclusion of the study, it was found that Jaipur’s waste management
system involves many types of workers who all have specialized jobs, including
government executives in political and administrative positions, a permanent and
impermanent faction in the formal sector, the informal sector (including ragpickers,
recyclable collectors, and scrap dealers), and private contractors. The formal sector seems
to be carrying out their duties effectively and on time, and there are few complaints from
citizens about their interaction with waste service providers.
Still there are many areas for improvement, including better law implementation
and reinforcement, reduction of corruption, updated technology, better-trained staff, more
manpower, increased education and awareness, and more funding. Public-private
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partnerships are a prudent strategy to increase efficiency in SWM because specialized
companies who are better financially equipped become the overseers of SWM for a
particular area or project. However they are very unprofitable for companies, so it has
been difficult to attract partnerships. In addition, corruption and unclear communication
between the involved parties have interfered in the success of partnerships.
There does not seem to be a large niche for NGOs in SWM. Both the Centre for
Development Communication and Satya have stopped door-to-door collection in
residential districts due to unprofitability and lack of community involvement. Both of
these NGOs have found other ways to be involved in SWM initiatives in Jaipur, but until
corruption and community education initiatives improve, NGOs cannot effectively offer
their services.
Upon completion of the study, a few questions present themselves for further
investigation. There are a few more details in the topic of system implementation which
have not been covered in as much depth, such as which types of places informal door-todoor workers take the trash. Is it just an informal empty lot dumpyard? Similarly, more
information about the transfer stations could be looked into. Are they distributed well
across the city? Do they create any problems for residents nearby? Following this strand
of inquiry, more of the social attitudes about waste and current waste management
practices could be investigated in order to understand both the shortcomings from the
citizens’ side and how to educate them more effectively. In this study, most of the
problems in waste management that were focused on were shortcomings from the
government side.
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Recommendations For Further Study
This study provides a broad overview of how solid waste management works in
Jaipur, what some obstacles are to its implementation and how they are being addressed,
and surrounding issues with the various players involved. Specific issues included
integration of the informal sector, education and awareness endeavors, and some
examples of PPPs in action. There are many options for expanding and delving deeper
into the subject of solid waste management. A comparative study could be conducted
between the waste management of two cities of similar size and population in which
successful programs in one city could be evaluated for possible replication in the other
city. Alternatively, successful PPPs that are profitable could be evaluated to see what the
company is doing that works well and how. Finally, further study on informal sector
incorporation could be pursued. Currently Jaipur does not have any formal plans to
incorporate the informal sector into PPPs. Evaluate the feasibility of doing so with
limited expenditure on training ragpickers for new tasks, similar to the project undertaken
in Delhi.68
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Appendix A
Jaipur’s Waste Management Hierarchy
As described by Dr. R. K. Garg, from Jaipur Nagar Nigam

Political Hierarchy
1. Mayor
2. Health and Sanitation Committee (Includes 5 elected and 3 nominated members)

Administrative Hierarchy
(See chart on next page)
Notes: Garage commissioner section oversees vehicles and transportation
CE section oversees development of landfill sites, processing plants, and civil
development for SWM
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CEO
8 Zones

Commissioner (Health)

1. Vidhyala Nagar

Commissioner (Garage)

Chief Engineer (CE)

Executive Engineer

Superintendent Engineer (SE)

(XEn) (9(((XEn)
Assistant Engineer (AEn)

2. Motidungari
Junior Engineer (JEn)

3. Sanganer

Assistant Engineer (AEn)

4. Mansarovar

Lalkhothi Garage

5. Amer

Chauhan Garage

6. Hawamahal East

Jhalana Garage

7. Hawamahal West

Vidhyala Nagar

Junior Engineer (JEn)

Garage
8. Civil Lines

For all JEns
Drivers

For all 8 zones
Health Officer (HO)
1 in each zone
Chief Sanitation Inspector
Inspector (CSI)
1 of them in zones 3,4,5,6,8

2 of them in zones 1,2,7

Sanitation Inspector
Supervisor
(Jamadar)
Sweepers (Safai Karamchari)

Executive Engineer
(XEn)

Mechanics
Time keepers
Cleaners (below the above
three)

Appendix B
Kabari Case Study
Majeet Khan has been doing kabari work for fifteen years. Daily (including
holidays) he comes with his wooden pushcart to collect newspapers, old books, glass and
plastic bottles, and iron scraps from houses and shops. Calling out “paper, ratdi
(“paper”), bottles!” he notifies people of his passing, and those who have things they
want to sell him will come out of their homes to do so.
Majeet sets his own route, and
always goes to the same places,
which are C-Scheme (including
places like Gopal Bari), Mani
Park, Civil Lines, Vaishali
Nagar, Gadged, Ajmeri Gate,
Sanganeri Gate, Bais Godam,
and even Chamod, which is more
than two hours away. In his
experience, the best area for business is Shivaji Nagar, in Civil Lines.1 When asked
whether people living in wealthier areas usually have more stuff to give, the answer was
unclear (and when the same question was asked of another kabari, he said no, there was
no difference). Perhaps this is because poorer people are in more need of the money, so
though they might have fewer plastic bottles and newspapers to sell, they are more
1

Khan, Majeet, kabari, personal communication, April 12, 2011

committed to selling them. Wealthier people might have more stuff they have
accumulated, but since they are not as in need of money they are not as eager to sell it.
One Monday the researcher accompanied Majeet on his route from about 9:3010:00 AM, but he did not collect anything. He said the shortage of business was partly
due to the fact that people were sleeping and resting. Usually he is able to buy more stuff
on weekends, supposedly because more people are home then, so he said to come back
with him on a Saturday or Sunday. Even on Saturday from 8:15-10:15 AM only one
person came out to sell him something—one glass bottle and three plastic milk sachets
(all for one rupee). Majeet said that usually he is able to get more than that, but because
of the researcher’s presence, fewer people were coming. Perhaps people were confused
about why there was a foreigner with him and thought they ought to do business with him
another time. It is unclear. Perhaps if he had been followed at a distance rather than
alongside, the influencing variable would have been eliminated.
After working from about 7 AM until the late afternoon, Majeet then takes his
goods to a kabari shop. The usual shop he sells to is run by Munna Kuresi in Raju Nagar.
There are about 40-50 scrap shops in that area. Majeet earns Rs 10 per kg of newspapers
he sells. Plastic fetches the same amount, and metal goes for Rs 20 per kg. Although
other materials may technically be recyclable, they are less often recycled because it costs
more to do so than the money they fetch in the marketplace.2 On his cart Majeet keeps a
scale to weigh the goods himself, but they are weighed again at the scrap shop. The shop
sells the scraps to any company, it does not matter which (and they have no contracts
2

Wilson, David C. (Dec 2010). Comparing Solid Waste Management in the World’s
Cities. ENVIS Urban Municipal Waste Management Newsletter, National Solid Waste
Associaition of India. (21), 2-10.
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with specific companies). As an example, one company purchases bottles which are taken
to a factory in Delhi, cleaned, and refurbished. The scrap shop, which employs about 50
people, can receive anywhere from Rs 5,000-20,000 worth of scraps (assumedly in a
day).3 Surprisingly, there is no leftover stuff that cannot be sold—everything is sold
eventually.
Not all kabari scrap shops sell directly to companies. Some sell to bigger scrap
shops. From those shops, cartons go to Sanganer, some glass bottles go to Madhya
Pradesh, others things go to Panjab, Haryana, and Uttarakhand. Plastic bottles are ground
up and reconstituted, while glass bottles are cleaned for repacking. Scrap metal is sold
locally in Jaipur. One interesting determinant of where certain materials go is how much
water is required for their refurbishing. Those states which have more water resources
such as Panjab and Haryana do more recycling because water is required to clean the
bottles. That is why the large glass bottles are sent there.4
Jaipur’s water scarcity has serious implications for its recycling capabilities.
Although recycling is an integral part of waste management, due to such constraints as
water scarcity it would appear that Jaipur cannot be entirely self-sufficient and selfcontained in all of its endeavors relating to processing waste, and must continue to send
many of its recycled materials to other states. The necessity of sending materials to other
states likely increases product costs as transportation costs are factored in, which works
against kabaris and kabari scrap shop owners. To what extent the cost of recycled goods
is affected by their destination distance has not been calculated.

3

Kuresi, Munna. kabari scrap shop owner, personal communication, April 24, 2011.

4

Singh, Uttam, kabari scrap shop owner, personal interview, Jaipur, April 26, 2011.
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Space is a very relevant concern for some of the smaller scrap shops, such as that
run by Uttam Singh. Due to the small confinement they cannot keep all their goods
within one room. As a result, many of the goods are out on the street or the sidewalks,
which is technically land to which they do not have a right. When government workers
come by and complain, scrap shop owners have to pay a small fee to appease them. Theft
is another consequence of keeping goods on the streets. This is the greatest difficulty in
Uttam Singh’s work.
Kabari work is unsatisfying for Majeet—he hopes to find a different job someday
soon. Although Majeet’s wife knows he works to earn money, she does not even know
what kind of work he does. When asked why he has not told her, he responded “What
advantage would that bring? It would only bring pain.” Supposedly the job is shameful,
though it does not seem as shameful as picking through garbage. He would like to be a
rickshaw driver, but to rent a rickshaw it costs Rs 100 a day. So he would need about Rs
40,000 to start him off for a year, which he cannot afford.
The researcher also had the pleasure of meeting Majeet’s family, who live on
Khatipura Road in Raju Nagar. Although Majeet is only 27 years old, he has been
married for 15 years and has four sons, one of whom is a newborn. He has four brothers
and a sister, who is well-off and owns a jeep. One of his brothers does the same work as
him, as does at least one of his cousins. Fifteen people live in his small house compound;
his wife and sons sleep in one room, and his parents and one of his brother’s families live
in the other rooms. Other relatives live just across the street.
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